

SECRET

*No during
4 Dec 53*

CAMLET CASE

The CAMLET case was first developed in 1948 with the objective of obtaining intelligence on the SED. (CAMLET - editor of SPDT-Telegraf.) The operation was handled as a regular formal case with Field Project Outlines until 1950, with operational contact maintained in Berlin by [] and informal contact in Frankfurt by []. In July 1951, [] advised HQ that he would continue to maintain informal contact with CAMLET. He stated that CAMLET left much to be desired as a source of specific secret intelligence but was very useful in keeping [] informed on general political trends in Bonn and Berlin. In Aug. '51, [] wrote that BOB's business relationship with him was just about over. BOB was dissatisfied because CAMLET had failed to produce operational leads; furthermore, it had been discovered that CIC, by recruiting the man in charge of CAMLET's East Zone coverage, had been getting the best of the political reports. BOB wished to know whether the customers wished to continue receiving the kind of reports that had been coming in. A check with customers, via REports, indicated that they did. (We have been getting from 12-25 reports a year from CAMLET; most of them have been disseminated. Two of the '53 reports were considered "very valuable" by ORR.)

In 1950, PP started to use the facilities of CAMLET's paper, but this operation has always been divorced from []'s contact. In Nov. '52, [] advised that the "intermittent contact" was maintained for the sole purpose of eliciting views on topical issues affecting US policy re Eastern Germany, especially insofar as conflicting US and SPD interests might be revealed. [] then branched out a bit, by asking CAMLET to help in the recruitment of a [] source in an important East Berlin target installation.

In the early summer of 1953, the CAMLET case, for reasons not ascertainable by the field case officer, suddenly became much more active. More reports were passed by CAMLET, and his attitude on disclosing operational details and eventually turning sources over to us changed. CAMLET stated that he wanted the material collected by his Ostbuero as a by-product of journalism made available to an agency able to evaluate it. [] then began to analyze the reports carefully from an operational viewpoint; this enabled him to identify several sources. Next he "got CAMLET to the point of suggesting" direct dealings with his Ostbuero chief, CAMLET 2. [] indicated that he viewed CAMLET 2 "with strong reservations, personally and professionally," but felt that for the purpose of discussing DDR matters, CAMLET was too second-hand. [] was aware that CAMLET 2 had been, and might still be, a CIC source.

[] reached an understanding with the CAMLETS that any of their subsources who might not produce info that could be used in the newspaper would be turned over to us if operationally feasible. Results: [] ; [] [].

Pullach advised that CAMLET 2 was a Zipperite, and that he had produced political intelligence from the "Telegraf IS net" for ZIPPER. [] thereupon interrogated CAMLET 2, as he did not wish to cross lines with ZIPPER. CAMLET 2 denied ZIPPER connections (nothing was said to CAMLET 1 by []). [] was not convinced, but detailed the meeting to Pullach. The CAMLET 2 version also got back to ZIPPER HQ, where the erroneous impression was developed that [] was trying to blackmail C-2. Pullach (29 Sept) requested that [] not discuss the question further with C-2, and advised that [] would discuss the case with [] at the first opportunity. No info has been received on the problem prior to IN 38947. Geyer ref - 11 (2 report being translated)